The Decline of the Adversary System and the Changing Role of the Advocate in That System by Landsman, Stephen
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 18 
Issue 2 1981 Article 3 
3-1-1981 
The Decline of the Adversary System and the Changing Role of 
the Advocate in That System 
Stephen Landsman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephen Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System and the Changing Role of the Advocate in That 
System, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 251 (1981). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol18/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
The Decline of the Adversary System
and the Changing Role of the
Advocate in that System
STEPHAN LANDSMAN*
For approximately 150 years the behavior of American lawyers
has been governed by ethical precepts premised upon an adver-
sary system of justice. These precepts have emphasized zealous
representation of clients even at the expense of the discovery of
material truth. In January 1980 the American Bar Association
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards proposed a
series of Model Rules challenging adversarial emphasis on zeal-
ous advocacy. This article suggests that adoption of the Model
Rules would interfere with a lawyer's ability to effectively per-
form his part in the judicial process. Such interference would
threaten the entire adversary system and the rights it vindicates.
This article will contend that the adversary process presently
utilized in American courts is being seriously challenged and that
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct proposed in January
1980 by the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards constitute a significant part of that chal-
lenge. The first section of this article will sketch the major prem-
ises, advantages and disadvantages of an adversary system. It
will be followed by a discussion of the genesis of two ethical prin-
ciples fundamental to such a system-zealous representation of
clients and limitation of candor to the court. After briefly.analys-
* Associate Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; A.B., Kenyon Col-
lege, 1969; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1972. The author wishes to acknowledge the
financial assistance of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund in the preparation of this arti-
cle. A somewhat different version of these materials was presented at the Interna-
tional Conference on Ethics and Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, Tel Aviv,
Israel, August 17-20, 1980.
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ing the nature of the challenge to the adversary process, the arti-
cle will examine the anti-adversarial implications of the
Commission's proposals. The article will conclude by suggesting
that non-adversary standards of conduct should not be accepted
unless the value judgments implicit in their adoption have been
carefully considered, that reform which involves ethical precepts
alone is inadequate because it creates serious conflicts for the
practicing lawyer, and that the adoption of a non-adversary ap-
proach may undermine fundamental human rights.
The American judicial system has for several hundred years
been committed to an adversary theory of litigation. This theory
holds that the sharp clash of proofs presented by adversaries in a
forensic setting is the method most likely to produce the informa-
tion upon which a neutral and passive decisionmaker can base
the resolution of a litigated dispute that will be acceptable to both
the parties and society.'
In the American setting the adversary process requires at least
three participants-two contending advocates and a deci-
sionmaker. Each of the advocates is charged with the task of
presenting the strongest available evidence to sustain the claims
of the party he represents. The decisionmaker is to remain a neu-
tral and passive auditor while the advocates make their presenta-
tions and is thereafter to fashion a decision.
To insure the neutrality and passivity of the decisionmaker the
adversary process employs a variety of measures. First, responsi-
bility for the development and presentation of evidence is placed
entirely upon the shoulders of the advocates. Second, the litiga-
tion process is regulated in such a way that it culminates in a sin-
gle- or multiple-session confrontation that affords the trier little
time or incentive for independent inquiry. Third, a strict evidence
code excludes potentially misleading or prejudicial material.
Fourth, the use of lay juries is encouraged so that disputes will be
decided by arbiters with few preconceived notions about the law
and no responsibility for the management of the case. Finally, ap-
pellate review insures that the various adversary regulations are
honored.
A variety of advantages has been ascribed to the adversary pro-
cess. Professor Lon Fuller has argued that such a process signifi-
cantly reduces the likelihood of decisionmaker bias.2 In their
1. This definition and much of the descriptive material concerning the adver-
sary system is drawn from my article, The Decline of the Adversary System How
the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American
Courts, 29 BUFFAwO L REV. 485 (1980).
2. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERCAN LAw 30 (IL Berman
ed. 1961).
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psychological studies, Professors Thibaut and Walker have sup-
plied some empirical data that tend to support this claim.3 Fur-
ther, adversary process is said to enhance the likelihood of
litigant and societal acceptance of decisions. This occurs because
each party can air his case fully and obtain a decision from an ar-
biter who has retained an appearance of neutrality by remaining
aloof from the contest.4 Finally, it is said that adversary process
tends to individualize the law.5 It does so by allowing each liti-
gant maximum control over the kinds of claims he can assert and
the way in which they will be asserted. This individualization is
also said to enhance the likelihood that the rights and dignity of
each litigant will be respected.6
The adversary process is not without its costs. Because of the
emphasis on party control and decisionmaker passivity, the liti-
gants may pursue their own ends without endeavoring to uncover
or present evidence indicative of material truth. Judge Marvin
Frankel, among others, has argued that this "low rating" of mate-
rial truth threatens the ability of the system to achieve just re-
sults.7 A second serious cost of adversary process is delay. The
adversary system is not designed to proceed at great speed. Strict
rules of evidence, juries and appellate review dramatically slow
proceedings. It has been argued by prestigious members of the
bench and bar that adversary system delay threatens the very
survival of the courts.8
While adversary notions have been extensively relied upon in
the structuring of the American judicial process, certain non-ad-
versarial elements have been introduced in an apparent effort to
minimize the likelihood that material truth will be overlooked or
that dilatory procedure will be allowed to bring the process to a
standstill. To ameliorate the danger that truth will not be ex-
posed, a system of pretrial discovery has been instituted. To com-
3. J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALY-
sis 49-51 (1975).
4. Id. at 68; W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 5
(1968).
5. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
6. See D. LOUIsELL & IL WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW, 403-04, 412-13
(1960).
7. Frankel, The Search for Trutk An Umpire47 View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031
(1975).
8. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 3-4 (1973);
Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.BAJ. 929, 932 (1970).
bat delay, various techniques including pretrial conferences and
the like have been adopted. In both cases reform was premised
upon a careful balancing of adversarial and non-adversarial con-
siderations.9 The primacy of the adversary process was preserved
in each case by placing the new procedure exclusively at the dis-
posal of the adversaries or by using it to facilitate preparation for
the adversary contest.
Advocates obviously play a central role in the adversary pro-
cess. Both the litigating parties and the decisionmaker depend on
their efforts. To insure that this dependency is not improperly ex-
ploited advocates have, from the earliest times, been subject to
restraint concerning their in- and out-of-court conduct.10 Various
ethical proscriptions supply that restraint.
The formal ethical proscriptions Americans rely upon today had
their beginnings in the early and middle years of the nineteenth
century. These proscriptions were shaped by adversary doctrine
which, along with laissez-faire economics, was reaching the
zenith of its influence during those years. Evidence of the semi-
nal influence of adversary doctrine may be seen in both the Eng-
lish and American experience. In a series of dramatic trials that
occurred between 1820 and 1840 the English bench and bar strug-
gled over two fundamental ethical questions. The first concerned
the proper limits of zealous advocacy on behalf of a client, and
the second concerned the duty of candor to a court. The classic
exposition of the adversarial notion of maximum zeal on behalf of
a client was provided by Lord Brougham during his defense of
Queen Caroline on a charge of adultery. Brougham declared:
[Aln advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this
duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he
may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patroit from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.11
Brougham's words were never accepted as authoritative, but they
did establish a standard that has proven extremely influential.
The second English trial to serve as a watershed experience in
the formulation of ethical principles was the Queen v.
Courvoisier.12 There the question of an advocate's duty to be
9. For an excellent example of this balancing process at work in the context
of discovery see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
10. See, e.g., H. DIamER, LEGAL ETHICS 14-15 (1953).
11. 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821), quoted in D. MELL'KoFF, THE CoN-
SCIENCE OF A LAWYER 189 (1973).
12. 173 Eng. Rep. 869 (1840), noted in THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 15 (1973)
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candid with the court was presented when, in the midst of a hotly
contested murder trial, the defendant privately ackowledged to
his attorney that he was guilty. Despite serious reservations,
Courvoisier's counsel thereafter vigorously attacked the prosecu-
tion's key witness and made a dramatic closing argument pre-
mised upon the possibility of Courvoisier's innocence. The
eventual disclosure that counsel had pressed his client's case
notwithstanding the confession provoked a public outcry that ex-
tended over a number of years. Despite adverse public reaction,
the case has come to be viewed as establishing the proposition
that in the adversary system an attorney's obligation to his client
may supersede his duty to be candid with the court and that any
other conclusion would undermine the vitally important bond be-
tween attorney and client.
These notions about zeal and candor were formally incorpo-
rated into American doctrine by Judge George Sharswood in his
classic Essay on Professional Ethics,13 first presented as a series
of lectures at the University of Pennsylvania in 1854. Sharswood
viewed zeal and confidentiality as necessary ethical accoutre-
ments to the adversary system and saw the adversary system as
the best available for conducting judicial business. Sharswood's
work was the basis for the three most important American ethics
codes: the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Associa-
tion,14 the 1908 American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics,15 and the 1969 American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.
The drafters of ethical standards concerning zeal and candor
have never adopted a purely adversarial position. Brougham's no-
tion of the exclusivity of a lawyer's duty to his client was not
widely shared even in his own day. Sharswood specifically re-
jected Brougham's position because it ignored the lawyer's re-
sponsibility as "an officer of the court."16 Later codes tracked
Sharswood's approach rather than Brougham's. Both Sharswood
D. MELLm1CoFF, (My discussion of Courvoiser's case is based primarily on Mel-
linkoff's book.).
13. G. SHARSWOOD, ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854), reprinted in 32
A.B._ REP. 1 (1907).
14. CODE OF ETICS OF =H ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1887), reprinted
in H. DRINKER, supra note 10, at 353.
15. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908), reprinted in H. DRINKER,
supra note 10, at 309.
16. SHARsWOOD, supra note 13, at 83-85.
and the American codes, however, did accord primacy to the cli-
ent's interest in most circumstances and uniformly demanded
zealous advocacy on the client's behalf.
With respect to the question of candor to the court, the drafters
of the codes followed a similar course. Although no code con-
tained a blanket rule forbidding disclosure in all circumstances,
each did establish a fairly broad zone in which candor was consid-
ered improper. Such rules have been the subject of extensive de-
bate. At least twice, reformers seeking greater candor succeeded
in placing their views in a code. On both occasions the require-
ment of candor was subsequently limited.17
Over the past ten years or so there has been a growing chal-
lenge to adversary principles and procedure. Almost all aspects
of the adversary process have been scrutinized and many have
been altered. The percentage of cases tried in adversarial pro-
ceedings has steadily declined and settlement has played an in-
creasing role. The adversary notion of the judge as passive
arbiter has been modified in several respects. Both by rule and
practice judges have become more active in settling cases, manag-
ing litigation and questioning witnesses. At the same time, the
use of lay juries, one of the most effective means of insuring deci-
sionmaker passivity and neutrality, has been limited. The
number of jurors has been reduced,18 the requirement of unani-
mous verdicts abandoned,19 and the scope of voir dire question-
ing narrowed.2 0 Various rules of evidence and procedure have
been modified and, pursuant to the doctrine of harmless error, ap-
peals concerning these rules have been curtailed.21 Most of these
changes have been made without discussion of their implications
for the future of the adversary process. But analysis suggests
movement in the direction of the adoption of a fast-paced, judge-
dominated, non-adversarial process.
The challenge to adversarial mechanisms has carried over into
17. With respect to the modification of the 1969 Code, see ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL REsPoNsmILrr Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) (1) as amended in 1974 pur-
suant to the action of the A.BA House of Delegates detailed in ABA SurMMRY OF
AcTioN TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (1974) (exempting from disclosure
"privileged communications"). With respect to the modification of the 1908 Ca-
nons, compare ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics Nos. 22, 29, 41 with ABA
CONZ. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPmNoNs, No. 287, at 613 (1953) ("Neither
the duty of candor and fairness to the court, as stated in Canon 22 [n) or the - -rovi-
sions of Canon [sic] 29 and 41 [duty to disclose fraud]... are sufficient to over-
ride the purpose, policy and express obligation under Canon 37 [duty to maintain
client's confidences].").
18. See, e.g., WilliAms v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
20. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
21. See Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L REV. 988 (1973).
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the field of legal ethics. Perhaps the most significant manifesta-
tion of this challenge is the proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct put forward in revised form in January of 1980 by the
A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards.
Judge Sharswood's commentary and the various American ethi-
cal codes were all premised upon an adversary system of justice.
Each envisioned the primary function of lawyers as advocacy on
behalf of clients who were involved in litigation or situations look-
ing toward litigation. The proposed Model Rules take a radically
different view. They are divided into a series of sections that ad-
dress different lawyer functions including advisor, negotiator, in-
termediary between clients, and legal evaluator as well as
advocate in adversary proceedings. The advocacy role is isolated
in a single section of the proposed Model Rules and the concerns
which arise out of the adversary process do not inform most of
the other sections of the Rules.
The proposed Model Rules do more than simply isolate and de-
emphasize the advocacy function. In the "Scope and Definitions"
section they seem to adopt the view that adversary procedure is
not entirely trustworthy and should seldom be used by litigants
to resolve a controversy arising under the Rules. The idea that
the Rules should not become an integral part of the procedural
fabric of the adversary contest is novel and seems to express a
lack of confidence in the efficacy of that contest. This refrain is
repeated in the official commentaries on Rule 1.8 concerning con-
flicts of interest and Rule 3.9 concerning cases in which an attor-
ney is likely to be a witness as well as an advocate.
The proposed Model Rules directly challenge a number of
premises integral to the adversary process. Neither Sharswood
nor the various codes required lawyers to expedite litigation.22
Indeed, speed is not a natural attribute of the adversary process
and the choice of an adversary system gives priority to delibera-
tion rather than celerity. In proposed Model Rule 3.3 this tradi-
tional position is rejected in favor of a requirement that the
advocate "make every effort ... to expedite litigation."
An even more fundamental challenge to adversary premises is
embodied in the Model Rules' treatment of the questions of attor-
ney zeal and candor. Zeal is the term that has traditionally been
22. G. SHAaswOOD, supra note 13, at 116 ("the suitor has a right to all the de-
lay ... which is incident to the ordinary course of justice.").
used to describe the duty owed by a lawyer to his client. It was
coined by Sharswood, and used in each of the codes that relied on
his work.23 The term zeal symbolizes the strength of the bond be-
tween lawyer and client in the adversary process.
Rule 1.5 of the proposed Model Rules abandons the concept of
zeal in describing the attorney's duty to his client. In place of
zeal the Model Rules adopt the far less compelling term "dili-
gence." Further, the entire tenor of the lawyer's relation to clients
has been altered. Rule 1.5 places particular emphasis on those oc-
casions when an attorney can refuse service to a client or limit
the scope of the service provided. The lawyer who acts in accord-
ance with Rule 1.5 is not the adversary advocate who commits, in
Sharswood's words, "[e]ntire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defence of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability;" 24 he is a counsellor
who is entitled to keep his clients at arms length and reject any
course of action he considers "repugnant or imprudent."25
A similar change of emphasis has taken place with respect to
the issue of candor. The very first duty of an advocate according
to Rule 3.1 of the proposed Rules is that "a lawyer shall be candid
toward a tribunal." Outside the criminal context, Rule 3.1 re-
quires that an attorney: fie no papers unless he believes that
"there is good ground to support" them; refrain from offering evi-
dence without explanation if the lawyer knows it is "substantially
misleading;" disclose the use of any and all false testimony even
if doing so will require disclosure of a client's confidences; dis-
close all adverse legal authority "that would probably have a sub-
stantial effect on the determination of a material issue;" and,
disclose any fact known to the lawyer that would have the effect
of correcting "a manifest misapprehension resulting from a previ-
ous representation."
Rule 3.1 challenges the traditional adversarial priorities of loy-
alty to a client and maintenance of his confidences. The proposed
Rule significantly increases the emphasis on the search for mate-
rial truth. In this search the attorney, at the risk of ethical sanc-
tion, is compelled to judge the merit of the client's claims, the
persuasive value of precedent, and the potential for misapprehen-
sion posed by each act he takes in the courtroom. Rule 3.1 moves
23. See CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION § 10 (1887),
reprinted in H. DRImER, supra note 10, at 355; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS No. 15 (1908), reprinted in IL DRINER, supra note 10, 313-14; ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY DIscPLwARY RuILE 7-101 (1969).
24. SHARSWOOD, supra note 13, at 78-79.
25. ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.5 (proposed January
30, 1980).
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advocacy toward the "amicus curiae" model described and re-
jected by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. Califor-
nia,26 a case involving an attorney's rejection of an indigent
defendant's appeal because he felt it did not have sufficient merit
to warrant the assistance of counsel compensated by the state.
A number of objections may be made to the changes proposed
in the Model Rules. The Rules, at least implicitly, reject adver-
sary procedure and appear designed to limit its application. Ad-
versary methodology may be outmoded and change may be
appropriate; however, before such a conclusion is warranted the
system must be forthrightly assessed. Its values as well as its de-
fects must be identified and weighed. In the official commentary
accompanying the proposed Model Rules no such weighing pro-
cess is evident. Without it wholesale rejection of adversary con-
cepts is not defensible.
If, after thorough debate, it is concluded that the adversary pro-
cess should be abandoned or drastically altered, then the entire
system should be reformed. Revising only the rules governing at-
torney conduct will not, by itself, achieve the desired results.
Piecemeal change will create serious conflicts for practicing law-
yers. Attorneys will often be forced to choose between the use of
perfectly legitimate adversary procedures and obedience to non-
adversary standards of conduct.
An example may help to clarify the nature of the problem. Var-
ious adversarial rules of evidence, including the hearsay, best evi-
dence, and authentication rules, insulate the decisionmaker from
information that has been determined, as a matter of law, to be
potentially untrustworthy or misleading. Such evidence, however,
may be highly relevant to the determination of material truth. In
cases where an attorney has previously offered proofs at odds
with such evidence how is he to proceed? If the attorney invokes
the evidentiary rule and excludes the evidence, truth may suffer
and, in some instances, the candor requirement of proposed Rule
3.1 may be breached.2V If the attorney refuses to invoke the evi-
dentiary rule, both the client's interests and the evidentiary rule
will be defeated.
A system with non-adversary ethics and adversary procedures
26. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
27. See ABA MODEL Rtlas, supra note 25; Rules 3.1 (a) (3) (the duty to explain
misleading evidence), 3.1(d) (2) (correction of manifest misapprehensions).
will frequently produce such conflicts. Many attorneys will be
thrown into confusion in such circumstances. Undoubtedly, some
will choose to evade the ethical requirements thereby weakening
the moral force of the ethical rules. Others will choose to obey
the ethical precepts and thereby weaken the adversary process.
The adversary system, at least in part, is predicated upon the
idea that each participant should play only a single role in the ad-
judicatory process. This proposition is clearest in the case of the
decisionmaker. Considerable effort is expended to insure that the
arbiter remains neutral and aloof from the contest. It is pre-
sumed that requiring the decisionmaker to develop the evidence
or manage the case would detract from the likelihood of success-
ful performance of the judging function. I would suggest that pre-
cisely the same principle applies to the advocates. Each advocate
is charged with the duty of gathering and presenting the evidence
that best serves his client's interests. To do this the lawyer must
be committed wholeheartedly to his client. As in the case of the
judge, the imposition of a conflicting function would undermine
the attorney's ability to do his assigned job.
The proposed Model Rules create a significant number of situa-
tions in which the attorney is to serve the court's or his own inter-
ests rather than those of his client. For example, Rule 3.1
repeatedly requires the lawyer to be the judge of his client's case.
The attorney must carefully weigh the merit of his client's claims,
determine the persuasive value of every precedent, and assess
the potential of each piece of evidence to mislead. Whenever the
attorney perceives a possible problem he must put his committ-
ment to his client to one side and assist the court. The attorney is
obliged at all times to serve two masters, court and client. The
Gospel according to Matthew says of such a situation:
[n]o one can serve two masters. For either he will hate the one and love
the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.28
Although compromise may be possible if conflict arises infre-
quently, placing the attorney in a continuously conflicted environ-
ment, like that created by Rule 3.1, will undermine his ability to
serve his clients.
The adversary process affirms human individuality. It man-
dates respect for the opinions of each client rather than those of
his attorney, the court, or society at large. It provides the client
with a neutral forum in which to air his views. Encouraging law-
yers to judge each client's case or reject cases because of feelings
of "repugnance" undercuts the individualizing mechanism. It
28. Matthew 7.24.
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suggests that in all close cases the system or its functionaries are
more important than the litigants.
By the strength of their advocacy and zeal on behalf of each cli-
ent, attorneys in an adversary system afCrm the proposition that
individuals have rights that antagonists cannot ignore. A society
that encourages a profession devoted to the vindication of private
rights is likely to be a society in which such rights will be
respected. Where zeal is curtailed the attorney is no longer free
to serve as the champion of any citizen's rights and the value of
the rights themselves is called into question.
The adversary process is not perfect nor is it capable, by itself,
of insuring a humane and effective court system. However, in a
time when human rights are constantly threatened and claims in-
volving the common good are ever more vigorously pressed, I
would argue that there is good reason to preserve the adversary
process. Reasonable men could reach the opposite conclusion,
but the utmost care should be exercised before such questions
are decided. What is lost may not be easily regained.

